Table 1. Human Capital and Authoritarianism
B
|
SE
|
|
Note. 2016 ANES. DV = Authoritarianism. All variables are
coded from zero to one. Entries were obtained using the “survey” package
in R, taking into account survey design characteristics according to the
recommendations in the 2016 ANES User's Guide.
|
||
Intercept
|
.79
|
.03
|
Age
|
.16
|
.02
|
Male
|
.00
|
.01
|
Black
|
.08
|
.02
|
Hispanic
|
.06
|
.02
|
Married
|
.03
|
.01
|
Number of kids
|
.03
|
.02
|
Income
|
−.06
|
.03
|
Unemployed
|
−.01
|
.03
|
South
|
.06
|
.01
|
Education
|
−.23
|
.02
|
Verbal ability
|
−.33
|
.03
|
1 - (Residual dev./Null dev.)
|
.20
|
|
N
|
3356
|
|
What are the implications of this for the relationship of
human capital to economic ideology? Based on self-interest theories, we would
expect human capital to be associated with reduced demand for redistribution,
social insurance, and market regulation. First, individuals with more capital
are expected to be more productive, on average, and thus to accumulate greater
wealth over the lifespan. In turn, they should be less supportive of
progressive taxation and redistribution from rich to poor (Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Stegmueller, 2013). Second, abilities
and skills that are portable across occupations and industries provide a form
of economic security, because they increase one's adaptability to changing
labor-market conditions. For example, individuals with higher levels of
cognitive ability may be able to learn new job-specific tasks more easily.
Similarly, individuals with higher education may have generalizable skills
sets, such as the ability to express themselves clearly in writing, that will
be useful in a wide variety of applications. Individuals with highly specific
skills, by contrast, are more tied to a specific job or industry and are thus
more exposed to economic risks, such as those associated with technological
change and automation (Iversen, 2005). In turn, high
levels of human capital should be associated with less demand for
redistribution, social insurance, and regulation (Iversen, 2005; Iversen &
Soskice, 2001; Stegmueller, 2011).
Finally, the United States has a comparative advantage
globally with respect to human capital and high-skilled labor. This means that
U.S. workers with capital benefit from integration into global markets, while
those with low levels of human capital will expect lower wages and job
security, on average. In turn, human capital should be associated with less
support for government regulation of trade and markets (Scheve &
Slaughter, 2001, 2006). In general,
then, a self-interest approach suggests that human capital will be associated
with economic conservatism.
Other research agrees with this hypothesis but highlights an
alternative mechanism. Work by Caplan (2001, 2002, 2007; Caplan
& Miller, 2010) shows that
noneconomists are more skeptical of free trade and markets than economists, and
this cannot be explained solely in terms of differences in ideology,
partisanship, or income. However, both cognitive ability and education increase
the extent to which people “think like economists.” In turn, these variables
should promote free market ideology at the margin.
The results presented in this article, however, suggest that
political engagement may reshape how indicators of human capital relate to
economic values and policy preferences. If human capital determines (or is at
least related to) authoritarianism, and if politically engaged citizens seek
out information from elite actors who share their traits and cultural
worldview, then the relationship of human capital to economic ideology should
reverse direction as a function of engagement, just like authoritarianism in
Figure 3. At low levels of engagement, we may see the
standard prediction from self-interest theories and Caplan's work, with low
human-capital citizens more liberal than their high-capital counterparts. But
as engagement increases, low-capital citizens should become increasingly
conservative, and high-capital citizens should become increasingly liberal.
Moreover, these changes should be explained, to a substantial extent at least,
by differences in authoritarianism.
To examine this possibility, I estimated models like those
underpinning Figure 3, but I substituted interactions of education and
verbal ability with engagement for the interactions of authoritarianism with
engagement. For these models, I again exclude African-American identifiers.26 The regression estimates are shown in
the appendix,
and I plot the key quantities in Figure 6. Overall, I find interactions of education
and verbal ability with engagement qualitatively like those for
authoritarianism. The constituent terms for education are positive in both
models, and for verbal ability in the values model, which implies that economic
conservatism increases as human capital increases among the politically
unengaged. However, the interactions are large and negative, which indicates
that the relationship of human capital to economic ideology flips sign as
engagement increases. These coefficients are statistically significant for
education in both models, but are not significant for verbal ability, though
the interaction terms are quite large for ability in both cases.27 As the two variables are substantially
correlated (r = .39), their effects likely overlap to some degree.28
Figure 6.
Economic preferences and human capital. Data is from the
2016 ANES.
The top panel of Figure 6 shows the key estimates for economic
policy, and the bottom panel shows the same for limited government values. The
y-axes represent increasingly conservative views. The x-axes represent
increasing levels of political engagement (ranging from its 5th to 95th
percentile). I plot predicted values of conservatism for two types of
respondents: those with relatively low levels of human capital and those with
relatively high levels of human capital. I define “low” as individuals with no
more than a high school degree or equivalent who score at the 25th percentile
of verbal ability. I define “high” as individuals with a graduate degree who
score at the 75th percentile of verbal ability. For economic policy, for
individuals with low levels of human capital, a shift in political engagement
from low to high is associated with an increase in conservatism of one-third of
one standard deviation.29 At high levels of human capital, the
same change in engagement is associated with a decline in
conservatism of .50 standard deviations. In other words, individuals with
relatively low education and verbal ability become more right-wing on economic
issues as engagement increases, while those with high levels of these
indicators become more left-wing. The results are similar for limited
government values. Here, the respective changes are .36 and −.61 points on the
4-point scale, respectively. Moreover, this pattern implies a reversal of the
sign of the relationship between human capital and economic preferences across engagement.
As seen in the figure, at low levels of engagement, human capital is positively
associated with economic conservatism, but at high levels of engagement, human
capital is negatively associated with conservatism. These results are
surprising from a self-interest perspective: Citizens are lesslikely to
pursue their prima facie economic interests as political
sophistication increases (Johnston et al., 2017, Chap. 7). But this
pattern is exactly what we should expect if human capital is associated with
authoritarianism, and engaged citizens are seeking out information on economic
issues from elites who share their traits and cultural worldview.
It is difficult to formally test the degree to which the
human-capital interaction is mediated by authoritarianism, but we can do a
rough test by adding the authoritarianism interaction to each model. Mediation
by authoritarianism implies that the interactions with human capital should be
substantially reduced in magnitude, and likely driven to insignificance. As
shown in Table A3 in
the appendix, this is indeed the case. Thus, the data are at least
consistent with a model in which education and verbal ability (or some
antecedent factor causing both) shape authoritarianism, and authoritarianism
shapes economic preferences in interaction with political engagement. However,
it is possible that there is an excluded mediator correlated with
authoritarianism that better explains these results.
Conclusions
Previous research argues that affective polarization is
rooted in the rise of elite partisan divisions over issues that tap into
authoritarianism, such as sexuality, gender, law and order, immigration, and
terrorism (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Yet, recent work
shows that Republicans and Democrats are now sorted and sharply divided on
economic issues as well (Webster & Abramowitz, 2017), and some of the
most heated debates of recent years concern seemingly technical questions, such
as those surrounding health insurance reform. In the present article, I have
shown that these competing perspectives may be reconciled to some degree, and
authoritarianism (and related personality factors) may be part of the
explanation for the link between polarization on size-of-government issues and
out-party dislike (Webster & Abramowitz, 2017). The authoritarian
divide has infused economic debates in the United States because engaged
citizens seek out, trust, and assimilate information about economic policy from
elites who share their traits and cultural worldview. Consistent with this
theory, among the politically engaged, child-rearing values are very strongly
associated with both party affect and economic conservatism, trumping income
and other common predictors of economic ideology in terms of explanatory value.
In two experimental studies, I also provided evidence that partisan-ideological
and cultural cue-taking is the causal mechanism driving this correlation among
engaged citizens.
In principle, politically active citizens could use distinct
decision rules in forming preferences across distinct dimensions of policy. For
example, authoritarianism might structure information seeking for issues
concerning (say) terrorism, but heuristics related to class might structure
information-seeking on issues of social welfare and market regulation. I might
trust people who exude “toughness” when it comes to thinking about how to deal
with ISIS but turn to those who share a class identity when it comes to health
insurance reform (e.g., Carnes & Sadin, 2014). This is true, even when—as
in the United States—the system effectively forces a choice between candidates
of only two parties on Election Day. If dimensions are kept distinct, vote
choice becomes a problem of weighing and combining the various policy
dimensions per one's priorities. That is, one can maintain the independence of
ideological dimensions and then trade off preferences across dimensions when
confronting the binary choice at the voting booth.
Yet, this is not how engaged citizens appear to operate.
Instead, they seem to have a strong need to reconcile their economic views with
the personality and cultural divisions emphasized by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and others (e.g.,
Frank, 2004; Haidt, 2012; Jost et al., 2003). This may be due to
the depth and emotional intensity of conflicts rooted in these considerations.
As argued by Kahan (2015) in his work on
climate change opinion, it may be too socially costly to deviate from the
economic views of those who share one's traits and cultural values; or,
perhaps, too disconcerting to associate oneself with the economic views of
opponents who are strongly disliked for these reasons. As partisanship has
become increasingly tied to authoritarianism among politically engaged
citizens, it may be more difficult than in the past to contemplate agreeing
with one's opponents on just about anything (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015)—even seemingly
technical issues like many of those in the economic domain. In this sense,
consistent with Webster and Abramowitz (2017), engaged citizens
are disagreeing disagreeably on economic issues; but, consistent with
Mason (2015b), the root cause of
the conflict is only loosely connected to policy content: “We might
believe that we are responding to specific policy disputes, but to a very real
extent we are also being driven by an automatic, basic need to defend our
social group” (p. 58).
These considerations suggest that competing explanations for
affective polarization are difficult to disentangle. For example, in a survey
experiment, Webster and Abramowitz (2017) find that policy
position taking strongly shapes citizens' feelings toward political actors. The
implication is that affective polarization is driven by ideology and economic
policy preferences. While this interpretation is reasonable, it is important to
remember that citizens' economic values and issue opinions are not fully
exogenous to the other dimensions that roil partisan conflict, and this fact
may shape our interpretations of the treatment effect. If authoritarianism is
at the root of economic values and preferences, is negative affect in this
experiment driven by policy position taking per se or by what position
taking signals about the traits and cultural values of the speaker?
The present article suggests the latter interpretation may be reasonable.
The present article also has broader implications for the
distribution of opinion on issues of redistribution, social insurance, and
market regulation across levels of human capital. Prior work suggests that
indicators of human capital should be associated with less support for
government intervention in the economy (e.g., Caplan, 2007; Caplan &
Miller, 2010; Iversen, 2005; Scheve &
Slaughter, 2001). Yet this work fails
to consider how human capital may also operate on
preferences indirectly via its association with personality traits
and cultural orientations. In societies like the United States (Malka et
al., 2014), in which parties
collapse economic and cultural issues to a single dimension, the tendency of
high-capital citizens to identify with the cultural left can distort the
expected relationship of capital to free-market conservatism, because citizens
receive utility from endorsing policies consistent with their cultural ingroup.
This helps to explain the tendency of engaged citizens to support economic
policies that seem to work against their narrow economic interests (Johnston et
al., 2017, Chap. 7). This is a
distinct mechanism by which the “culture wars” can influence economic policy
outcomes. Rather than displacing the economic domain as a
consideration in vote choice—an idea that is the focus of much previous work
(e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2006; Bartels, 2006; Frank, 2004)—the rise of cultural
conflict may change the very bases of economic preferences, tying these to the
traits and values that shape citizens' reactions to the symbols of cultural
liberalism and conservatism, and thus altering the structure of ideology for
politically active citizens.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed
to Christopher D. Johnston, Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708. E-mail: cdj19@duke.edu
Footnotes
1
The data are from the 2016 American National Election Study
(ANES). Relative party affect is defined as the difference in party feeling
thermometers. “Politically engaged” is defined as respondents in the top 25% of
the distribution of political interest and knowledge (see the appendix for
variables used to construct this scale). Authoritarianism is measured with the
standard set of four child-rearing items, which are also provided in the appendix.
2
For an in-depth examination of differences across racial and
ethnic groups, see Johnston et al. (2017; see also Gerber,
Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010).
3
Tesler's (2012, 2015) work on the
spillover of racial attitudes onto healthcare opinion in the Obama era is
similar in this respect, as is Kahan and Braman's (2006) conceptualization of
cultural cognition. In Tesler's work, racial attitudes become linked to
seemingly unrelated issues, because Obama is a persistent prime for racial
attitudes, and because citizens use what amounts to an affect heuristic in
deciding whom to believe at the elite level. In Kahan and Braman's work,
citizens trust elites on factual issues when they share core values related to
hierarchy and individualism. Both programs have influenced our thinking about
the influence of personality on preference formation (Johnston et al., 2017).
4
See the appendix for
the items used to construct the economic policy scale.
5
Throughout the article, I will use the terms “liberal” and
“conservative” in the contemporary American sense of support and opposition to
government intervention in markets, respectively.
6
Research suggests that cognitive ability is linked to
support for markets (Caplan & Miller, 2010). I will further
discuss the relevance of this variable in the last empirical section.
7
Significance tests for conditional marginal effects are
conducted via simulation from the sampling distribution. A “significant”
marginal effect is defined as one for which 95% of the simulated coefficients
are on one side of zero.
8
There is no significant interaction between income and
engagement when I add the latter to the model. When I remove authoritarianism
and its interaction from the model, there is a significant interaction between
engagement and income, but engagement reduces the size of income's
effect on preferences. That is, the effect of income is strongest for the least
engaged citizens. This replicates the pattern reported in Johnston et al. (2017, Chap. 7).
9
Johnston et al. (2017) find support for
this “reversal hypothesis” in ANES data from 1992 to 2012. Malka et al. (2014) find support for the
same reversal in other political contexts using World Values Survey data.
10
The analysis here differs a bit from that reported
in Open versus Closed. First, I examine only non-Black respondents.
Second, I specify the regression model in the second experiment in a slightly
different way to demonstrate that the results are robust to alternative ways of
modeling the engagement interaction.
11
The survey was conducted by YouGov in March of 2011.
12
Conservation versus openness-to-change values have been used
in previous work to tap the predisposition to authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003), and the need for
closure is closely related to other measures of authoritarianism (RWA, Jost et
al., 2003). Scores on the
authoritarianism dimension are correlated at .79 with scores on the
superordinate factor in these data (Johnston et al. 2017, p. 190).
13
The appendix contains
the exact wording for these items.
14
Respondents were assigned to the same condition for each of
the four issues, and I combine the four preference items into a single scale
(α = .80).
15
When the elite-cues conditions are examined separately, the
effect of cues is much larger for partisanship than for ideology. Additional
work with a larger sample size is needed to determine if this is a reliable
pattern or idiosyncratic to these data.
16
In Figure 4, the x-axis ranges from the 5th percentile of
the personality scale (“Low”) to the 95th percentile (“High”).
17
I do not, however, find a reversal at low levels of
engagement. This is perhaps due to the smaller sample size and greater overall
level of engagement of this study relative to the ANES. There may be too few
very unengaged citizens in these samples to detect the reversal. Alternatively,
as we discuss in Johnston et al. (2017), the positive effect
of authoritarianism among the engaged may simply be stronger and more reliable
than the negative effect among the unengaged.
18
The goal here was to increase the generalizability of the
study by including distinct types of economic issues.
19
This measure is similar to other recent work on policy
choice in the context of candidate position taking (Sniderman &
Stiglitz, 2012; Tomz & van
Houweling, 2008).
20
Unfortunately, there are relatively few truly unengaged
respondents in the CCES sample.
21
See Brandt and Crawford (2016) for an important
theoretical and empirical caveat to the cognitive ability
to prejudice link. They argue and find that ability is related to
prejudice in different ways depending on the target group. Low cognitive
ability is associated with prejudice against groups that tend to be associated
with the political left, while high cognitive ability is associated with
prejudice against groups associated with the political right.
22
See Cor, Haertel, Krosnick, and Malhotra, (2012) for a psychometric
critique of the 10-item inventory. The problem highlighted in this article is
that the inventory contains insufficient coverage of the latent ability domain.
This appears to be true in the 2016 ANES, in that there are no items with very
high levels of difficulty. This suggests that the test will not be able to
discriminate among respondents with moderately high and very high ability
levels (Embretson & Reise, 2000). For the purposes of
the present article, however, this should not present a serious problem, as I
am interested in the nature of the relationship between ability and
preferences, rather than individual-level estimates of ability. If anything,
the reduced variation at the high end of ability should result in conservative estimates
of the magnitude of the relationship of ability to authoritarianism and
economic preferences.
23
For example, as reported in Caplan and Miller (2010, p. 639), past
research has found correlations between general intelligence and verbal ability
of .70 or higher (e.g., Wolfe, 1980).
24
A simple loess fit of authoritarianism to educational
attainment suggests that this relationship is close to linear across the
categories of the latter variable.
25
But see Pérez and Hetherington (2014) for a critical
treatment of the Black-White gap in authoritarianism.
26
As with the models for authoritarianism, the results are
stronger if I consider only non-Hispanic Whites. I report the models for
non-Blacks to maximize population coverage and thus to increase the
generalizability of the reported results.
27
In non-Hispanic-Whites-only models, the constituent and
interaction terms for ability are larger and statistically significant in the
values model and increase substantially in absolute magnitude in the policy
model.
28
It is also possible that the effects of verbal ability are
mediated by education. Consistent with this possibility, the interactions for
ability are significant when I remove education from the models. It is,
however, impossible to determine the causal sequence using these data.
29
All marginal effects reported in this section are
statistically significant.
Articles on Cult Dynamics
Authoritarianism, Affective Polarization, and Economic Ideology (with commentary)
Candidates for Cults: Are Symbiosis & Double-Binding Precursors for Cult Membership?
Candidates for Cults: Are Symbiosis & Double-Binding Precursors for Cult Membership?
Coercive Persuasion & Attitude Change in Cults: Standing on Ofshe's Shoulders
Lifton's Cult Formation (1981) with Commentary
Lifton's Cult Formation (1981) with Commentary
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