Thursday, September 16, 2021

An Object Relations Approach to Cult Membership (with Comments)

 

An Object Relations Approach to Cult Membership

Joseph D. Salande, M.S., and David R. Perkins, Ph.D.

30 Apr 2018

https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.psychotherapy.2011.65.4.381

https://psychotherapy.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.psychotherapy.2011.65.4.381

The Authors' original text is in black. My hopefully useful comments are in dark red.

Abstract

Several pieces of literature suggest that most individuals who are successfully integrated into cults do not typically manifest symptoms of mental illness. However, the public is often taken aback by the lack of autonomy displayed by cult members and is bewildered by the ability of the cult leader and other cult members to transform fundamental personality functioning in an individual. Within the framework of an object relations model of personality structure and functioning as delineated by Otto Kernberg and using existing data concerning the cult experience, the authors engage in a theoretical exploration of cult membership. The authors propose that some behaviors exhibited by cult members may be a function of an object relations-level regression, which is exemplified by the activation of primitive defensive operations that are usually relegated to those suffering with severe personality disorders.

Introduction

In any discussion of the cult experience, whether from an objective/empirical perspective or from a subjective/experiential perspective, it is necessary to understand an oft-repeated concept in much of the literature concerning cults: no one joins a cult (Zimbardo, 1997). In other words, cult recruits typically believe they are joining a legitimate and healthy group that will not abuse them (Almendros, Carrobles, & Rodriguez-Carballeira, 2007; Goldberg, 1997; Shaw, 2003 Zimbardo, 1997). It is necessary to start here because understanding that cult members usually begin their journey with a well-intentioned search for meaning, fulfillment, social change, happiness, and belonging (i.e. the "bait" preceding the "bite") helps dispense with the general incomprehension about why anyone would join a cult.

While individual cultic groups may vary in discipline (political, religious, social/philosophical), they often operate with a similar premise: the world is bad, we are good, become a part of us (thus leveraging the dichotomizing attitude that is so common as to be near-universally taken for granted in the general population, even including many who have been exposed to "collegiate critical thinking"). Viewing the world in this way is not, in and of itself, destructive; and many mainstream religious and political movements embrace similar philosophies. However, cult leaders often reinforce this view with a frightening intensity while simultaneously inducing dissociative states among their followers through extensive and repetitive prayer (Goldberg, 1997; MacHovec, 1992; Young & Griffith, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997) (and compulsory, narrow point of focus, mantra-style -- as opposed to "insight" -- meditation; especially in Asian, Asian-style and Western "human potential" cults), sleep deprivation (Goldberg, 1997; Morse & Morse, 1987), and other methods to be discussed later. Constant social pressure to conform and comply (Hassan, 1988, Zimbardo, 1997), reinforcement of paranoid ideation about the outside world (Morse & Morse, 1987; Rust, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997) (which is what is easily observed while watching various cable news propaganda), and externally induced dissociative states (Ash, 1985; DSM-IV-TR, 2000; Goldberg, 1997; Langone, 1996; MacHovec, 1992; Morse & Morse, 1987) (usually via long lectures triggering fatigue, powerful emotions owing to self-recognition cult members ultimately cannot tolerate without "checking out," and shutdown of the pre-frontal cerebral corteces that make that possible,all coalesce to activate a primitive level of object relationships as indicated by the cult member’s display of primitive defense mechanisms (including denial, distortion and delusional projection; see George Vaillant). The relationship among primitive defensive operations, level of personality organization, and adherence to and fervor for the cult experience will be examined shortly.

The question of what qualifies as a cult must be addressed before delving further into the specific defensive operations to which we refer or to the methods that cults use to bring about this impaired level of psychological functioning. The authors of this paper use Chambers, Langone, Dole, and Grice’s (1994) definition of cults as being those

… groups that often exploit members psychologically and/or financially, typically by making members comply with leadership’s demands through certain types of psychological manipulation, popularly called mind control, and through the inculcation of deep-seated anxious dependency on the group and its leaders (p. 88). (But there are numerous others; see Bonwit’s, Goleman's, Gottschalk’s & Pattison’s, Hassan’s, Langone’s, Ofshe’s, West’s and Zieman’s at this location.)

A distinction based on two sets of dynamics should be drawn between legitimate political, social, and religious groups/movements and cults. The first is the ‘methods cults use (as opposed to those used by more benign groups), the second is the disparity in outcomes between the two sets of groups. Concerning the first distinction, the following are frequently reported occurrences in what are referred as cults (Almendros et al., 2007; Goldberg, 1997; Langone, 1996; Shaw, 2003, Young & Griffith, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997), coercion, intimidation, threats, physical and verbal abuse, manipulation, dishonesty (by leadership, including anyone one level higher on the Cultic Pyramid), sexual bullying, isolation and separation from friends and family, and forfeiture of personal finances (as well as purposeful confusion via duplicity; public criticism, embarrassment, humiliation, insult, invalidation, ridicule, scorn, denigration, vilification, and persecution in front of other members;  scapegoating; gaslighting and emotional blackmail... and Alexandra Stein and I will assert that it is previous exposure, socialization, habituation and normalization to such treatment by parents, older siblings and others to whom the cult member was powerfully attached long before he or she joined the cult that makes such treatment tolerable under the stress of John Bowlby's anxious insecure attachment). Whereas those conditions certainly exist in legitimate organizations (Young & Griffith, 1997), they are often the exception rather than the rule. Concerning the second point: no legitimate religion, political movement—or any group for that matter—has a 100% retention rate, much less a 100% success rate in whatever areas of personal or social functioning that they purport to improve. However, with cults, the member is, more often than not, left in a much worse position than in which he started, whether it be financially, psychologically, relationally, or some combination of these and other factors (Langone, 1996; Morse & Morse, 1987; Robinson, Frye, & Bradley, 1997) (see The Five Progressive Qualities of the Committed Cult Member).

The question, from a social-psychological perspective, of how an individual is drawn into and eventually controlled by a cult becomes one of established research. The power of social influence on conformity, as well as the power of an authority figure to induce compliance, have both been made abundantly clear and certainly play an integral role in cult integration. However, this perspective does not address the more internal dynamics that are activated through the cult experience, to which we attempt to speak. It has been observed that those who join cults do not appear to suffer significantly higher instances of psychological illness before entering the cult environment than the general population. As Langone (1996) stated, “No particular psychopathology profile is associated with cult involvement, in part because cults, like many effective sales organizations, adjust their pitch to the personality and needs of their prospects” (p. 2). The acknowledgement that cult members are not qualitatively different from the general population in any specific area of adjustment or psychological functioning is an essential component of the current authors’ proposed theory. It is worth mentioning, however, that several authors have found that there are some developmental and relational factors (as I noted above, but which were not cited by the authors of this paper) that may make some individuals more susceptible to cult recruitment (Buxtant, Saroglou, Casalfiore, & Christians, 2007; Buxtant & Saroglou, 2008; Robinson, Frye, & Bradley, 1997) (though in my view, less with regard to recruitment than to retention through the increasingly challenging and dysphoria-inducing middle levels of the Cultic Pyramid).

The authors propose that many of the experiences of the cult member serve to weaken normal ego functioning through methods which induce dissociation (Ash, 1985; Goldberg, 1997; Morse & Morse, 1987), compromise critical thinking and volition (Goldberg, 1997; Morse & Morse, 1987; Robinson et al., 1997; Young & Griffith, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997), and impose tremendous social pressure to conform and comply (Hassan, 1988; Langone, 1996; Zimbardo, 1997) (see "Understanding Codependency as "Soft-Core" Cult Dynamics... and Cult Dynamics as "Hard-Core" Codependency" at this location). These experiences lead to the activation of a primitive level of object relationships and defensive operations that Otto Kernberg linked specifically to the borderline level of personality organization (Kernberg, 1976; Kernberg, 1984).

Object Relations Theory and Its Role in the Cult Experience

The role of object relations in the cult experience may only be a topic of conjecture but the authors propose, as have others, that the cult experience taps into unconscious attachment needs that motivate and direct the cult member’s behavior. As stated earlier, an intense process of dissociating and manipulating experiences set the stage for an ego regression. This externally induced ego regression activates early attachment needs, a primitive level of object relationships and object representations, and corresponding engagements in primitive defensive operations. It is the emergence of these defensive operations that indicate the cult member is indeed operating, if only temporarily, at the borderline range of personality organization.

Theoretical particularities aside, it is also important to note that the construct of borderline personality organization (which, for the purposes of this paper at least, is essentially "splitting" as described in the Reddit reply by u/not-moses at this locationis not synonymous with the DSM-IV TR diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder. While individuals fitting the DSM-IV TR diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder certainly utilize primitive defensive operations (and are in fact operating at the borderline level of personality organization), the borderline personality organization construct also describes other severe personality disorders. A borderline level of personality organization, as indicated by the use of primitive defensive operations is also commonly observed in Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as Antisocial Personality Disorder (Gacono, Meloy, & Berg, 1992; Kernberg, 1984; Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual 2006) (but in my experience having engaged with hundreds of current and former cult members who reached the middle and upper middle levels on the Cultic Pyramidfar more significantly in Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder).

We will now spend some time differentiating this paper’s object relations theory framework from others. While the foundation of object relations theory lies in Freudian drive/structural theory, the concept of object relations has been widely expounded upon by many noteworthy theorists. Melanie Klein, Ronald Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, Harry Guntrip, Heinz Hartman, Margaret Mahler, Edith Jacobson, Heinz Kohut, and Joseph Sandler all have made invaluable contributions to object relations theory. Despite sharing the same theoretical school of thought, they often disagree with each other’s conceptions on the object and relevance of the groundwork laid by Sigmund Freud. While there are some conceptually significant differences among the different schools of thought within object relations theory, they are tied together by the underlying theme of internal representations of important “objects.” At their core all object relations theories are concerned with unconscious mental representations of others (often called introjects; in the currently more widely used Internal Family Systems Model, as well as in Kluft's, Lynn & Rhue's, Putnam's, Herman's, and van der Hart's notions of Dissociative Identity Disorder, introjects are roughly equivalent to some but not all of one's "parts" or "alters") that form in the earliest parts of mental life and the internal relationship to those representations. The internal relationships to these mental representations then guide interactions with others. As Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) stated, “In some way crucial exchanges with others leave their mark; they are internalized and so come to shape subsequent attitudes, reactions, perceptions, and so on” (p. 11).

This distinction among different object relations theorists is relevant only to the extent that the authors are using an object relations model of personality developed by Otto Kernberg. This model retains much of the theoretical groundwork of Freud’s structural/drive model. Kernberg constructed his theory within the framework of the Freudian meta-psychology, at least in part, because he saw object relations theory as “already implied in Freud’s writings” (Kernberg, 1976, p. 58). He also viewed object relations theory as a sort of venue of commonality, a theoretical disposition “which permits relating the works of authors of different schools to one another” (1976, p. 58).

At this juncture it would be useful to briefly describe some of the essentials of Kernberg’s views on personality organization, which will be of relevance to this topic. In his book Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis (1976), Kernberg proposed the existence of two separate levels of “ego organization,” with each level centered on the defensive pattern of splitting or repression. These differing levels of personality organization are indicated by differing patterns of defensive operations (very much including paranoid projection and projective identification in my observation of current and former cult members; see below), with pathological ego/superego development leading to the display of “primitive” patterns of defensive operations, while healthy ego/superego development leading to the utilization of higher order defensive operations (Kernberg, 1976; Kernberg, 1984). (While the authors here do get into superego development, my sense is that their "coverage" is astonishingly brief. I have yet to encounter a a current or former, long-duration cult member who reached the middle or upper middle levels on the Cultic Pyramid whose superego was anything but largely "taken over" by the cult. Anyone who has read Robert Jay Lifton's work clear back to 1961 understands that in depth and detail.) 

Kernberg went on to discuss in detail, in his 1984 work Severe Personality Disorders: Psychotherapeutic Strategies, an expanded set of primitive defensive operations including splitting, primitive idealization (of not only the guru or founder, but of pretty much all those above the member's own level on the Cultic Pyramid; it's as though they had regressed to the cloying, desperate-for-approval, hero-worshipping -- and imitating, which I see a vital to understand relative to dissociative splitting in the compensatory authoritarian and grandiose behaviors of middle-level cult members -- social interaction of middle school students), denial, omnipotence, devaluation, and projective identification. Kernberg identified those individuals who, due to genetic/temperamental factors in conjunction with poor ego/superego development and integration, utilize this pattern of primitive defensive operations as operating at the “borderline” level. And while ego/superego strength and integration determines one’s level of personality organization, where an individual falls along the continuum of personality organization (healthy-neurotic-borderline-psychotic) may be inferred by the defensive pattern which he or she utilizes. This theoretical disposition also recognizes identity integration and maintenance of reality testing as integral components of personality organization, and interestingly enough, these dimensions also appear to be compromised by the cult experience, though this paper will limit itself to the primitive defensive operations exhibited by cult members.

Psychological Dynamics Associated with Cult Membership & Specific Defensive Operations

The authors do not argue that the cult experience leads to the spontaneous development of a personality disorder (which may or may not be the actual case in my experience; what I have observed first-hand runs the gamut of a spectrum that begins at regression to latent childhood predispositions expanding all the way to florid symptoms of several DSM Axis II PDs, very much including paranoid, schizotypal, narcissistic, histrionic, passive-aggressive, borderline, obsessive-compulsive and/or Martin Seligman's "learned helplessness" in extreme dependent traits). Rather, we propose the cult experience weakens healthy ego functioning in such a way that much of the puzzling and self-destructive behavior exhibited by cult members is the result of primitive defensive operations. This pattern of defensive operations appears very similar to that exhibited by individuals operating at, what Otto Kernberg termed, the borderline level of personality organization. In essence, the cult experience degrades (although that does occur, my observations suggest "distorts" at least as often as it "degrades") the ego, effectively causing the individual to regress into a transient state of borderline personality organizational-style functioning that may resolve itself once the individual leaves the group (which is, fortunately, often the case, though former members who have had ego-syntonic experiences in the cult may carry such distortions with them henceforth in the form of narcissistic grandiosity and over-certainty... while former members who had essentially ego-dystonic experiences tend to be left with some degree of Seligman's syndrome noted above). This assertion is based on two separate observations. The first, as mentioned before, is that cult members exhibit behavior that is strikingly similar to behaviors associated with primitive defensive operations, such as splitting (Goldberg, 1997; Whitsett, 1992). The second seems to be the activation of important object relations-level attachment needs, which helps to motivate the cult member’s behavior (Shaw, 2003; Whitsett, 1992).

We seek to shed light on some of the more puzzling behaviors of cult members in terms of their striking similarity to the primitive defensive operations described by Kernberg. The first, most apparent, and broadest, defensive operation that seems to be expressed in the well-integrated cult member is splitting. This is an observation made by Doni P. Whisett (1992) in her discussion of the cult phenomenon from a self-psychological approach based on Heinz Kohut work, “cults divide up the world into ‘we/they’—‘we’ being the saved” (p. 370). As simplified by Kernberg (1984), “the clearest manifestation of splitting is the division of external objects into “all good” and “all bad” (p. 16).

Splitting is most often referred to in the context of an individual changing his perception of and reaction to an external object from that of an “all good” classification to an “all bad” classification, or vice versa. However, splitting also may be a function of how an individual views the group he or she is part of, and that group’s relationship to the outside world. Thus, by virtue of being part of the “good” group, one is made “all good” and is thereby in serious conflict with the outside world, which is, of course, “all bad.” Robinson, Frye, and Bradley (1997) alluded to this phenomenon in their discussion of cult affiliation and disaffiliation, “critical thinking is compromised and individuals are encouraged to view their families of origin and the non-cult world as bad or evil, whereas the cult beliefs and activities are all seen as good” (p. 167).

Omnipotence and devaluation, which are “derivatives of splitting operations affecting the self and object representations” (Kernberg, 1984, p. 17), are expressed by the cult member through the ways in which he views himself in relation to those who are not part of the group. Cult members are sometimes fearful or hostile towards those on the outside, but often there is an air of pity or even condescension towards those “unenlightened” individuals who are not part of the group. For example, individuals who have left the Church of Scientology have reported that nonbelievers are sometimes referred to as “wogs” by active scientologists. “Wog” is a sort of light-hearted pejorative in the religion of Scientology, describing those who are not “on the path to total freedom,” in other words, those who are not part of the Church (Goodstein, 2010). Scientology also encourages its members to separate themselves from “SPs”, or “suppressive persons,” those individuals critical of the organization and thus, major impediments to the progress of practicing Scientologists (Goodstein, 2010). This dynamic of omnipotence vs. devaluation is often overtly based on the premise that those belonging to the group, especially the leadership, have surpassed the abilities and knowledge of a “normal” person and gained access to some special knowledge or salvation reserved exclusively for the group members. This separation of the omnipotent cult leader (and by extension, cult members) from the devalued public is not simply a function of a philosophy or world view, but a reflection of primitive object relationships that have been activated through the cult experience.

Cult members often see themselves, and the group they are a part of, as more enlightened, informed, understanding of the true nature of things, or just better than the population at large; they may manifest this as an arrogant dismissal of more mainstream ways of thinking and acting, or express a form of antagonistic defiance in the face of what the members perceive as external aggression. In the case of the latter, cult members manifest the defensive operation of projective identification (a primitive form of the better-known defense mechanism of projection). Projective identification differs from projection in that projection involves the detection of one’s own feelings or impulses in an external object; projective identification involves an unconscious effort to elicit an expected response or behavior from an external object.

Thus, cult members expect nonmembers to be hostile or threatening to them or their group, but actually, they create the dynamics between themselves and the outside world that fits their own relational expectations. As one former Unification Church member (now cult exit counselor reported), “Whenever people yelled at me and called me a ‘brainwashed robot,’ I just took it as an expected persecution. It made me feel more committed to the group” (Hassan, 1988, p. 53). Cult leaders such as David Koresh and Jim Jones were notoriously paranoid about interference from the government, and this paranoid ideation was reflected in many of their follower’s attitudes and behaviors. In reality however, these leaders and their followers effectively guaranteed the exact kind of interference that they claimed to fear.

Primitive idealization is another defensive operation addressed by Otto Kernberg that seems applicable to the well-integrated cult member. As stated by Kernberg (1984), “Primitive idealization creates unrealistic, all-good and powerful images” (p. 16). This is expressed in the classic cult behavior of blindly following an “all-good” or “all powerful” charismatic leader. The cult members’ zeal in following the leader is evidenced not only by what the members are willing to subject themselves to, for example, in the case of the Heaven’s Gate cult multiple suicides; but also in what cult members are willing to do to outsiders at the behest of the leader, such as in the crimes committed by members of the Manson family.

One need not look to these more extreme examples to illustrate this phenomenon. Primitive idealization is present in more benign cult settings, and it would appear to be a reflection of the cult leader’s ability and need to satisfy his or her own dependency needs by, as Shaw (2003) states “exploiting universal human dependency and attachment needs in the others”(p. 110). Shaw, a self-identified former cult member and now clinical social worker, goes on to propose that “Cult leaders tap into and re-activate this piece of the human psyche. Followers are encouraged to become regressive and infantilized, to believe that their life depends on pleasing the cult leader” (2003, p. 110). (In my experience, former cult members who left the cult infantilized and regressed often respond to Eriksonian "redevelopment" on the heels of successfully addressing their "learned helplessness" with strategies and tactics similar to those used in the treatment of any other form of Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, very much including Marlene Winnell's "Religious Trauma Syndrome.")

Denial is a more obvious example of defensive operations at work within the cult member’s psyche. As mentioned before, cult recruits usually begin their journey with good intentions and high expectations. Once the recruit is a member, and thus heavily invested in the group and its program, a certain amount of subjective experience must be detached from the individual’s conscious awareness so that his subjective experience matches his expectations, protects idealization of the leader, and secures his own omnipotence over nonmembers.

Kernberg (1984) stated: “Denial may be manifested as a complete lack of concern, anxiety, or emotional reaction about an immediate, serious, pressing need, conflict, or danger to the patient’s life” (p. 17). While Kernberg is clearly discussing denial in a clinical context, it would be an error to assume that these dynamics are not applicable to nonclinical situations in which ego functioning is compromised and infantile attachment patterns are activated. In essence, the cult member would not be able to continue the cult experience without evincing (what typically, in my experience, is a truly dissociated and "split off" form of) denial. Denial can continue to protect the cult member’s beliefs even after the cult leader has been shown to be a charlatan. “Loyal members of a cult believe that their leader has magically transformed their lives and relieved their longing and suffering. On that basis, they will staunchly defend their leader even when his or her crimes are exposed” (Shaw, 2003, p. 118).

Conclusions

In his discussion of these primitive defensive operations, Kernberg (1984) describes them as having “ego-weakening effects” (p. 113), while this paper has proposed that other factors, such as excessive prayer and mediation or sleep deprivation, are the actual culprits of the ego-weakening that cult members display. This is not, however, a disagreement of what comes first because we are talking about two very different populations. Kernberg (1984) addresses these topics in the context of individuals with temperamental and characterological predispositions to ego-weakness. This paper addresses the activation of primitive defensive operations in the context of those with relatively healthy personalities, or those at least typically operating outside of the borderline range of personality organization. In other words, cult members begin the cult experience with relatively good ego strength, which is methodically chipped away through experiences that lead to ego-weakening (through the fifth, sixth and seventh levels on the Cultic Pyramid), and thus the activation of primitive defensive operations, which in turn further exacerbates this ego-weakening process. (BUT... at the eighth level, their egos are "rehabilitated" to serve without question the narcissistic imperatives of those at the ninth and tenth levels. Another way of putting it is that higher-level cult members can be "rescuers" and "persecutors" on Karpman Drama Triangles with those on the levels below them, while being obvious "victims" in dealings with those on levels above them, as Mike Rinder's and Ron Miscavige's revelations of their behavior in the Church of Scientology, and my own in what was then called Erhard Seminars Training, will attest.)

While this paper does not seek to discount the social-psychological dynamics that influence cult members’ behaviors, it does attempt to propose a new theoretical framework through which to understand the cult member experience. Previous authors, such as Walsh and Bor (2001), have called for a “psychological model” to better understand the “processes people experience as they meet, enter, and leave such groups” (p. 127). We submit that there are powerful unconscious motivators, in the form of the activation of early attachment needs and primitive defensive operations, which heavily influence the cult member.

Possibilities for further investigation would include a more in depth exploration of how ego strength and identity integration are compromised through the early cult experience leading to successful integration into the cult group.

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Other resources include those in "A Basic Cult Library" at this location.