An Object Relations Approach to Cult Membership
Joseph D. Salande, M.S.,
and David R. Perkins, Ph.D.
30 Apr 2018
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.psychotherapy.2011.65.4.381
https://psychotherapy.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.psychotherapy.2011.65.4.381
The Authors' original text is in black. My hopefully useful comments are in dark red.
Abstract
Several pieces of literature suggest that most individuals who are
successfully integrated into cults do not typically manifest symptoms of mental
illness. However, the public is often taken aback by the lack of autonomy
displayed by cult members and is bewildered by the ability of the cult leader
and other cult members to transform fundamental personality functioning in an
individual. Within the framework of an object relations model of personality
structure and functioning as delineated by Otto Kernberg and using existing
data concerning the cult experience, the authors engage in a theoretical
exploration of cult membership. The authors propose that some behaviors
exhibited by cult members may be a function of an object relations-level
regression, which is exemplified by the activation of primitive defensive
operations that are usually relegated to those suffering with severe
personality disorders.
Introduction
In any discussion of the cult experience, whether from an
objective/empirical perspective or from a subjective/experiential perspective,
it is necessary to understand an oft-repeated concept in much of the literature
concerning cults: no one joins a cult (Zimbardo, 1997). In
other words, cult recruits typically believe they are joining a legitimate and
healthy group that will not abuse them (Almendros, Carrobles, &
Rodriguez-Carballeira, 2007; Goldberg, 1997; Shaw, 2003 Zimbardo, 1997). It is
necessary to start here because understanding that cult members usually begin
their journey with a well-intentioned search for meaning, fulfillment, social
change, happiness, and belonging (i.e. the "bait" preceding the "bite") helps dispense with the general
incomprehension about why anyone would join a cult.
While individual cultic groups may vary in discipline (political, religious, social/philosophical), they often operate with a similar premise: the world is bad, we are good, become a part of us (thus leveraging the dichotomizing attitude that is so common as to be near-universally taken for granted in the general population, even including many who have been exposed to "collegiate critical thinking"). Viewing the world in this way is not, in and of itself, destructive; and many mainstream religious and political movements embrace similar philosophies. However, cult leaders often reinforce this view with a frightening intensity while simultaneously inducing dissociative states among their followers through extensive and repetitive prayer (Goldberg, 1997; MacHovec, 1992; Young & Griffith, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997) (and compulsory, narrow point of focus, mantra-style -- as opposed to "insight" -- meditation; especially in Asian, Asian-style and Western "human potential" cults), sleep deprivation (Goldberg, 1997; Morse & Morse, 1987), and other methods to be discussed later. Constant social pressure to conform and comply (Hassan, 1988, Zimbardo, 1997), reinforcement of paranoid ideation about the outside world (Morse & Morse, 1987; Rust, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997) (which is what is easily observed while watching various cable news propaganda), and externally induced dissociative states (Ash, 1985; DSM-IV-TR, 2000; Goldberg, 1997; Langone, 1996; MacHovec, 1992; Morse & Morse, 1987) (usually via long lectures triggering fatigue, powerful emotions owing to self-recognition cult members ultimately cannot tolerate without "checking out," and shutdown of the pre-frontal cerebral corteces that make that possible,) all coalesce to activate a primitive level of object relationships as indicated by the cult member’s display of primitive defense mechanisms (including denial, distortion and delusional projection; see George Vaillant). The relationship among primitive defensive operations, level of personality organization, and adherence to and fervor for the cult experience will be examined shortly.
The question of what qualifies as a cult must be addressed before
delving further into the specific defensive operations to which we refer or to
the methods that cults use to bring about this impaired level of psychological
functioning. The authors of this paper use Chambers, Langone, Dole, and Grice’s
(1994) definition of cults as being those
… groups that often exploit members
psychologically and/or financially, typically by making members comply with
leadership’s demands through certain types of psychological manipulation,
popularly called mind control, and through the inculcation of deep-seated
anxious dependency on the group and its leaders (p. 88). (But there are numerous others; see
A distinction based on two sets of dynamics should be drawn between legitimate political, social, and religious groups/movements and cults. The first is the ‘methods cults use (as opposed to those used by more benign groups), the second is the disparity in outcomes between the two sets of groups. Concerning the first distinction, the following are frequently reported occurrences in what are referred as cults (Almendros et al., 2007; Goldberg, 1997; Langone, 1996; Shaw, 2003, Young & Griffith, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997), coercion, intimidation, threats, physical and verbal abuse, manipulation, dishonesty (by leadership, including anyone one level higher on the Cultic Pyramid), sexual bullying, isolation and separation from friends and family, and forfeiture of personal finances (as well as purposeful confusion via duplicity; public criticism, embarrassment, humiliation, insult, invalidation, ridicule, scorn, denigration, vilification, and persecution in front of other members; scapegoating; gaslighting and emotional blackmail... and Alexandra Stein and I will assert that it is previous exposure, socialization, habituation and normalization to such treatment by parents, older siblings and others to whom the cult member was powerfully attached long before he or she joined the cult that makes such treatment tolerable under the stress of John Bowlby's anxious insecure attachment). Whereas those conditions certainly exist in legitimate organizations (Young & Griffith, 1997), they are often the exception rather than the rule. Concerning the second point: no legitimate religion, political movement—or any group for that matter—has a 100% retention rate, much less a 100% success rate in whatever areas of personal or social functioning that they purport to improve. However, with cults, the member is, more often than not, left in a much worse position than in which he started, whether it be financially, psychologically, relationally, or some combination of these and other factors (Langone, 1996; Morse & Morse, 1987; Robinson, Frye, & Bradley, 1997) (see The Five Progressive Qualities of the Committed Cult Member).
The question, from a social-psychological perspective, of how an
individual is drawn into and eventually controlled by a cult becomes one of
established research. The power of social influence on conformity, as well as
the power of an authority figure to induce compliance, have both been made
abundantly clear and certainly play an integral role in cult integration.
However, this perspective does not address the more internal dynamics that are
activated through the cult experience, to which we attempt to speak. It has
been observed that those who join cults do not appear to suffer significantly
higher instances of psychological illness before entering the cult environment
than the general population. As Langone (1996) stated, “No particular
psychopathology profile is associated with cult involvement, in part because
cults, like many effective sales organizations, adjust their pitch to the
personality and needs of their prospects” (p. 2). The acknowledgement that cult
members are not qualitatively different from the general population in any
specific area of adjustment or psychological functioning is an essential
component of the current authors’ proposed theory. It is worth mentioning,
however, that several authors have found that there are some developmental and
relational factors (as I noted above, but which were not cited by the authors of this paper) that may make some individuals more susceptible to cult
recruitment (Buxtant, Saroglou, Casalfiore, & Christians, 2007; Buxtant
& Saroglou, 2008; Robinson, Frye, & Bradley, 1997) (though in my view, less with regard to recruitment than to retention through the increasingly challenging and dysphoria-inducing middle levels of the Cultic Pyramid).
The authors propose that many of the experiences of the cult member serve to weaken normal ego functioning through methods which induce dissociation (Ash, 1985; Goldberg, 1997; Morse & Morse, 1987), compromise critical thinking and volition (Goldberg, 1997; Morse & Morse, 1987; Robinson et al., 1997; Young & Griffith, 1992; Zimbardo, 1997), and impose tremendous social pressure to conform and comply (Hassan, 1988; Langone, 1996; Zimbardo, 1997) (see "Understanding Codependency as "Soft-Core" Cult Dynamics... and Cult Dynamics as "Hard-Core" Codependency" at this location). These experiences lead to the activation of a primitive level of object relationships and defensive operations that Otto Kernberg linked specifically to the borderline level of personality organization (Kernberg, 1976; Kernberg, 1984).
Object Relations
Theory and Its Role in the Cult Experience
The role of object relations in the cult experience may only be a
topic of conjecture but the authors propose, as have others, that the cult
experience taps into unconscious attachment needs that motivate and direct the
cult member’s behavior. As stated earlier, an intense process of dissociating
and manipulating experiences set the stage for an ego regression. This
externally induced ego regression activates early attachment needs, a primitive
level of object relationships and object representations, and corresponding
engagements in primitive defensive operations. It is the emergence of these
defensive operations that indicate the cult member is indeed operating, if only
temporarily, at the borderline range of personality organization.
Theoretical particularities aside, it is also important to note
that the construct of borderline personality organization (which, for the purposes of this paper at least, is essentially "splitting" as described in the Reddit reply by u/not-moses at this location) is not synonymous
with the DSM-IV TR diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder. While
individuals fitting the DSM-IV TR diagnostic criteria for Borderline
Personality Disorder certainly utilize primitive defensive operations (and are
in fact operating at the borderline level of personality organization), the
borderline personality organization construct also describes other severe personality
disorders. A borderline level of personality organization, as indicated by the
use of primitive defensive operations is also commonly observed in Narcissistic
Personality Disorder as well as Antisocial Personality Disorder (Gacono, Meloy,
& Berg, 1992; Kernberg, 1984; Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual 2006) (but in my experience having engaged with hundreds of current and former cult members who reached the middle and upper middle levels on the Cultic Pyramid, far more significantly in Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder).
We will now spend some time differentiating this paper’s object
relations theory framework from others. While the foundation of object
relations theory lies in Freudian drive/structural theory, the concept of
object relations has been widely expounded upon by many noteworthy theorists.
Melanie Klein, Ronald Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, Harry Guntrip, Heinz Hartman,
Margaret Mahler, Edith Jacobson, Heinz Kohut, and Joseph Sandler all have made
invaluable contributions to object relations theory. Despite sharing the same
theoretical school of thought, they often disagree with each other’s
conceptions on the object and relevance of the groundwork laid by Sigmund
Freud. While there are some conceptually significant differences among the
different schools of thought within object relations theory, they are tied
together by the underlying theme of internal representations of important
“objects.” At their core all object relations theories are concerned with unconscious
mental representations of others (often called introjects; in the currently more widely used Internal Family Systems Model, as well as in Kluft's, Lynn & Rhue's, Putnam's, Herman's, and van der Hart's notions of Dissociative Identity Disorder, introjects are roughly equivalent to some but not all of one's "parts" or "alters") that form in the
earliest parts of mental life and the internal relationship to those
representations. The internal relationships to these mental representations
then guide interactions with others. As Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) stated,
“In some way crucial exchanges with others leave their mark; they are
internalized and so come to shape subsequent attitudes, reactions, perceptions,
and so on” (p. 11).
This distinction among different object relations theorists is
relevant only to the extent that the authors are using an object relations
model of personality developed by Otto Kernberg. This model retains much of the
theoretical groundwork of Freud’s structural/drive model. Kernberg constructed
his theory within the framework of the Freudian meta-psychology, at least in
part, because he saw object relations theory as “already implied in Freud’s
writings” (Kernberg, 1976, p. 58). He also viewed object relations theory as a
sort of venue of commonality, a theoretical disposition “which permits relating
the works of authors of different schools to one another” (1976, p. 58).
At this juncture it would be useful to briefly describe some of
the essentials of Kernberg’s views on personality organization, which will be
of relevance to this topic. In his book Object Relations Theory and
Clinical Psychoanalysis (1976), Kernberg proposed the existence of two
separate levels of “ego organization,” with each level centered on the
defensive pattern of splitting or repression. These differing levels of
personality organization are indicated by differing patterns of defensive
operations (very much including paranoid projection and projective identification in my observation of current and former cult members; see below), with pathological ego/superego development leading to the display
of “primitive” patterns of defensive operations, while healthy ego/superego
development leading to the utilization of higher order defensive operations
(Kernberg, 1976; Kernberg, 1984). (While the authors here do get into superego development, my sense is that their "coverage" is astonishingly brief. I have yet to encounter a a current or former, long-duration cult member who reached the middle or upper middle levels on the Cultic Pyramid whose superego was anything but largely "taken over" by the cult. Anyone who has read Robert Jay Lifton's work clear back to 1961 understands that in depth and detail.)
Kernberg went on to discuss in detail, in his 1984 work Severe
Personality Disorders: Psychotherapeutic Strategies, an expanded set
of primitive defensive operations including splitting, primitive idealization (of not only the guru or founder, but of pretty much all those above the member's own level on the Cultic Pyramid; it's as though they had regressed to the cloying, desperate-for-approval, hero-worshipping -- and imitating, which I see a vital to understand relative to dissociative splitting in the compensatory authoritarian and grandiose behaviors of middle-level cult members -- social interaction of middle school students),
denial, omnipotence, devaluation, and projective identification. Kernberg
identified those individuals who, due to genetic/temperamental factors in
conjunction with poor ego/superego development and integration, utilize this
pattern of primitive defensive operations as operating at the “borderline”
level. And while ego/superego strength and integration determines one’s level
of personality organization, where an individual falls along the continuum of
personality organization (healthy-neurotic-borderline-psychotic) may be
inferred by the defensive pattern which he or she utilizes. This theoretical
disposition also recognizes identity integration and maintenance of reality
testing as integral components of personality organization, and interestingly
enough, these dimensions also appear to be compromised by the cult experience,
though this paper will limit itself to the primitive defensive operations
exhibited by cult members.
Psychological
Dynamics Associated with Cult Membership & Specific Defensive Operations
The authors do not argue that the cult experience leads to the
spontaneous development of a personality disorder (which may or may not be the actual case in my experience; what I have observed first-hand runs the gamut of a spectrum that begins at regression to latent childhood predispositions expanding all the way to florid symptoms of several DSM Axis II PDs, very much including paranoid, schizotypal, narcissistic, histrionic, passive-aggressive, borderline, obsessive-compulsive and/or Martin Seligman's "learned helplessness" in extreme dependent traits). Rather, we propose the cult
experience weakens healthy ego functioning in such a way that much of the
puzzling and self-destructive behavior exhibited by cult members is the result
of primitive defensive operations. This pattern of defensive operations appears
very similar to that exhibited by individuals operating at, what Otto Kernberg
termed, the borderline level of personality organization. In essence, the cult
experience degrades (although that does occur, my observations suggest "distorts" at least as often as it "degrades") the ego, effectively causing the individual to regress into
a transient state of borderline personality organizational-style functioning
that may resolve itself once the individual leaves the group (which is, fortunately, often the case, though former members who have had ego-syntonic experiences in the cult may carry such distortions with them henceforth in the form of narcissistic grandiosity and over-certainty... while former members who had essentially ego-dystonic experiences tend to be left with some degree of Seligman's syndrome noted above). This assertion is
based on two separate observations. The first, as mentioned before, is that
cult members exhibit behavior that is strikingly similar to behaviors
associated with primitive defensive operations, such as splitting (Goldberg,
1997; Whitsett, 1992). The second seems to be the activation of important
object relations-level attachment needs, which helps to motivate the cult
member’s behavior (Shaw, 2003; Whitsett, 1992).
We seek to shed light on some of the more puzzling behaviors of
cult members in terms of their striking similarity to the primitive defensive
operations described by Kernberg. The first, most apparent, and broadest,
defensive operation that seems to be expressed in the well-integrated cult
member is splitting. This is an observation made by Doni P. Whisett (1992) in
her discussion of the cult phenomenon from a self-psychological approach based
on Heinz Kohut work, “cults divide up the world into ‘we/they’—‘we’ being the
saved” (p. 370). As simplified by Kernberg (1984), “the clearest manifestation
of splitting is the division of external objects into “all good” and “all bad”
(p. 16).
Splitting is most often referred to in the context of an
individual changing his perception of and reaction to an external object from
that of an “all good” classification to an “all bad” classification, or vice
versa. However, splitting also may be a function of how an individual views the
group he or she is part of, and that group’s relationship to the outside world.
Thus, by virtue of being part of the “good” group, one is made “all good” and
is thereby in serious conflict with the outside world, which is, of course,
“all bad.” Robinson, Frye, and Bradley (1997) alluded to this phenomenon in
their discussion of cult affiliation and disaffiliation, “critical thinking is
compromised and individuals are encouraged to view their families of origin and
the non-cult world as bad or evil, whereas the cult beliefs and activities are
all seen as good” (p. 167).
Omnipotence and devaluation, which are “derivatives of splitting
operations affecting the self and object representations” (Kernberg, 1984, p.
17), are expressed by the cult member through the ways in which he views
himself in relation to those who are not part of the group. Cult members are
sometimes fearful or hostile towards those on the outside, but often there is
an air of pity or even condescension towards those “unenlightened” individuals
who are not part of the group. For example, individuals who have left the
Church of Scientology have reported that nonbelievers are sometimes referred to
as “wogs” by active scientologists. “Wog” is a sort of light-hearted pejorative
in the religion of Scientology, describing those who are not “on the path to
total freedom,” in other words, those who are not part of the Church
(Goodstein, 2010). Scientology also encourages its members to separate
themselves from “SPs”, or “suppressive persons,” those individuals critical of
the organization and thus, major impediments to the progress of practicing
Scientologists (Goodstein, 2010). This dynamic of omnipotence vs. devaluation
is often overtly based on the premise that those belonging to the group,
especially the leadership, have surpassed the abilities and knowledge of
a “normal” person and gained access to some special knowledge or salvation
reserved exclusively for the group members. This separation of the omnipotent
cult leader (and by extension, cult members) from the devalued public is not simply
a function of a philosophy or world view, but a reflection of primitive object
relationships that have been activated through the cult experience.
Cult members often see themselves, and the group they are a part
of, as more enlightened, informed, understanding of the true nature of things,
or just better than the population at large; they may manifest this as an
arrogant dismissal of more mainstream ways of thinking and acting, or express a
form of antagonistic defiance in the face of what the members perceive as
external aggression. In the case of the latter, cult members manifest the
defensive operation of projective identification (a primitive form of the
better-known defense mechanism of projection). Projective identification
differs from projection in that projection involves the detection of one’s own
feelings or impulses in an external object; projective identification involves
an unconscious effort to elicit an expected response or
behavior from an external object.
Thus, cult members expect nonmembers to be hostile or threatening
to them or their group, but actually, they create the dynamics between
themselves and the outside world that fits their own relational expectations.
As one former Unification Church member (now cult exit counselor reported),
“Whenever people yelled at me and called me a ‘brainwashed robot,’ I just took
it as an expected persecution. It made me feel more committed to the group”
(Hassan, 1988, p. 53). Cult leaders such as David Koresh and Jim Jones were
notoriously paranoid about interference from the government, and this paranoid
ideation was reflected in many of their follower’s attitudes and behaviors. In
reality however, these leaders and their followers effectively guaranteed the
exact kind of interference that they claimed to fear.
Primitive idealization is another defensive operation addressed by
Otto Kernberg that seems applicable to the well-integrated cult member. As
stated by Kernberg (1984), “Primitive idealization creates unrealistic,
all-good and powerful images” (p. 16). This is expressed in the classic cult
behavior of blindly following an “all-good” or “all powerful” charismatic
leader. The cult members’ zeal in following the leader is evidenced not only by
what the members are willing to subject themselves to, for example, in the case
of the Heaven’s Gate cult multiple suicides; but also in what cult members are
willing to do to outsiders at the behest of the leader, such as in the crimes
committed by members of the Manson family.
One need not look to these more extreme examples to illustrate
this phenomenon. Primitive idealization is present in more benign cult
settings, and it would appear to be a reflection of the cult leader’s ability
and need to satisfy his or her own dependency needs by, as Shaw (2003) states
“exploiting universal human dependency and attachment needs in the others”(p.
110). Shaw, a self-identified former cult member and now clinical social
worker, goes on to propose that “Cult leaders tap into and re-activate this
piece of the human psyche. Followers are encouraged to become regressive and
infantilized, to believe that their life depends on pleasing the cult leader”
(2003, p. 110). (In my experience, former cult members who left the cult infantilized and regressed often respond to Eriksonian "redevelopment" on the heels of successfully addressing their "learned helplessness" with strategies and tactics similar to those used in the treatment of any other form of Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, very much including Marlene Winnell's "Religious Trauma Syndrome.")
Denial is a more obvious example of defensive operations at work
within the cult member’s psyche. As mentioned before, cult recruits usually
begin their journey with good intentions and high expectations. Once the
recruit is a member, and thus heavily invested in the group and its program, a
certain amount of subjective experience must be detached from the individual’s
conscious awareness so that his subjective experience matches his expectations,
protects idealization of the leader, and secures his own omnipotence over
nonmembers.
Kernberg (1984) stated: “Denial may be manifested as a complete
lack of concern, anxiety, or emotional reaction about an immediate, serious,
pressing need, conflict, or danger to the patient’s life” (p. 17). While
Kernberg is clearly discussing denial in a clinical context, it would be an
error to assume that these dynamics are not applicable to nonclinical
situations in which ego functioning is compromised and infantile attachment
patterns are activated. In essence, the cult member would not be able to
continue the cult experience without evincing (what typically, in my experience, is a truly dissociated and "split off" form of) denial. Denial can continue to
protect the cult member’s beliefs even after the cult leader has been shown to
be a charlatan. “Loyal members of a cult believe that their leader has
magically transformed their lives and relieved their longing and suffering. On
that basis, they will staunchly defend their leader even when his or her crimes
are exposed” (Shaw, 2003, p. 118).
Conclusions
In his discussion of these primitive defensive operations,
Kernberg (1984) describes them as having “ego-weakening effects” (p. 113),
while this paper has proposed that other factors, such as excessive prayer and
mediation or sleep deprivation, are the actual culprits of the ego-weakening
that cult members display. This is not, however, a disagreement of what comes
first because we are talking about two very different populations. Kernberg
(1984) addresses these topics in the context of individuals with temperamental
and characterological predispositions to ego-weakness. This paper addresses the
activation of primitive defensive operations in the context of those with relatively
healthy personalities, or those at least typically operating outside of the
borderline range of personality organization. In other words, cult members
begin the cult experience with relatively good ego strength, which is
methodically chipped away through experiences that lead to ego-weakening (through the fifth, sixth and seventh levels on the Cultic Pyramid), and
thus the activation of primitive defensive operations, which in turn further
exacerbates this ego-weakening process. (BUT... at the eighth level, their egos are "rehabilitated" to serve without question the narcissistic imperatives of those at the ninth and tenth levels. Another way of putting it is that higher-level cult members can be "rescuers" and "persecutors" on Karpman Drama Triangles with those on the levels below them, while being obvious "victims" in dealings with those on levels above them, as Mike Rinder's and Ron Miscavige's revelations of their behavior in the Church of Scientology, and my own in what was then called Erhard Seminars Training, will attest.)
While this paper does not seek to discount the
social-psychological dynamics that influence cult members’ behaviors, it does
attempt to propose a new theoretical framework through which to understand the
cult member experience. Previous authors, such as Walsh and Bor (2001), have
called for a “psychological model” to better understand the “processes people
experience as they meet, enter, and leave such groups” (p. 127). We submit that
there are powerful unconscious motivators, in the form of the activation of
early attachment needs and primitive defensive operations, which heavily
influence the cult member.
Possibilities for further investigation would include a more in
depth exploration of how ego strength and identity integration are compromised
through the early cult experience leading to successful integration into the
cult group.
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and Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder, New York: The Guilford Press, 1989.
Putnam, F.: Dissociation
in Children and Adolescents: A Developmental Perspective, New York: The
Guilford Press, 1997.
Rinder, M.: Mike
Rinder’s blog at this location. (Rinder was a ninth-level member of the Church of Scientology for many years.)
Van der Hart, O.;
Nijenhuis, E.; Steele, K.: The Haunted Self: Structural Dissociation and the
Treatment of Chronic Traumatization, New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.
Winnell, M.: Leaving
the Fold: A Guide for Former Fundamentalists and Others Leaving Their Religion,
Berkeley, CA: Apocryphile Press, 2006.
Other resources include those in "A Basic Cult Library" at this location.
